Undistracted John Gruber on Secure Intent on Apple Devices. A interesting dive into spoof proof secure intent: “a physical link—from a physical button to the Secure Enclave…used to confirm user intent during Apple Pay transactions,” and how it plays out on Apple devices with Face ID and Touch ID. He makes a good case for multi-sensor biometric authentication. What interests me most however is the secure intent mention in Apple Pay component security Secure Enclave section:
On Apple Watch, the device must be unlocked, and the user must double-click the side button. The double-click is detected and passed directly to the Secure Element or Secure Enclave, where available, without going through the Application Processor.
Apple doesn’t spell it out but this is confirmation that a GlobalPlatform licensed Embedded Secure Element is simply part of every Apple Silicon package, and for all Secure Intent purposes indistinguishable from the Secure Enclave. If push comes to shove over governments trying to force Apple to ‘open up’ the NFC chip, the counter argument will be that the NFC chip is open for Core NFC purposes but the Secure Element cannot be open because it’s part of the Secure Enclave on proprietary Apple Silicon.
Given that Apple added the Secure Intent section to Apple Platform Security very recently, expect to hear more at WWDC21 in connection with secure payments and UWB.